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Proposal for a DoD Combined 
Battlefield Electromagnetic 
Environmental Effects (E3) Initiative 
George H. Baker 
Defense Nuclear Agency 
Electronics Effects Division 
I,;. 
" 
OBJECTNES 
The brief begins by emphasizing the growing importance of electromagnetic survivability and compatibility. Next, 
the brief considers factors which pose implementation challenges/problems. While many technical questions will 
need to be resolved, the major challenges are associated with organization and process given the large number of 
technical disciplines and organizations involved. The last part of the brief proposes a top-level solution path. 
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OBJECTIVES 
• Review importance of electromagnetic 
survivability I compatibility 
• Identify current implementation challenges 
• Propose OSD-Ievel solution path 
" 
BACKGROUND 
Operation Desert Storm demonstrated the clear military advantage provided by sophisticated electronic weapon and 
C4I systems. In addition, the offensive tactic of taking out the enemy's eyes and ears during the air war paid off, 
giving us decisive air superiority. The lessons for the future are clear. High-tech electronics now so dominates the 
battlefield that the outcome of future conflicts could well be decided by electronics attrition rather than human 
casualties. Our Desert Storm experience thus accentuates the importance of guaranteeing that our electronic systems 
will not be disabled either deliberately or accidentally by electromagnetic environmental effects. 
The increasing use of commercial equipment in military applications will require that commercial and military 
standards be integrated to some degree. 
Recognizing the growing importance of electronics survivability, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J6) has requested and 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition has tasked the development of Combined Battlefield Environmental 
Effects (CBEE). 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
BACKGROUND 
DESERT STORM proved criticality of sophisticated electronics to 
U.S. military operations 
Rapid deployment strategy places even higher premium on 
electronic control 
Outcome of future conflicts could be determined by electronics 
attrition 
Must take steps to ensure that our electronics will not be disabled by 
intentional or inadvertent means 
Integration of commercial and military standards could result in 
markedly improved . . 
Cost effectiveness 
Uniformity and consistency of E3 protection 
Control and audit of E3 activities 
JCS has requested combined battlefield effects standard 
(including E3, NBC) 
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II 
ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS (E3) 
The simple definition of E3 is "the sum total of electromagnetic environments in which a system must live and 
operate." A multitude of individual effects contribute to this environment. Sources of these environments are both 
man-made and natural. Man-made environments can be friendly or hostile. The large number of potential sources 
complicates the environments definition problem. The formidable list of more traditional environments (EM I, 
lightning, ESD, EMP, HERF, TEMPEST, EW) is lengthened by emerging threats from high power microwave and 
ultra-wide band electromagnetic technologies. Many of the operative environments overlap in the frequency and 
amplitude of the electrical stresses they create. 
At present, the system acquisition process does not treat electromagnetic environmental effects in an integrated 
manner. This results in duplication of effort, inconsistencies, and increased cost to protect and validate systems. 
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ELECTROMAGNETIC 
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS (E3) 
E3 INTERRELATIONSHIP 
The list of operative effects is long and are shown separated according to nuclear and non-nuclear. 
Nuclear weapons create a variety of very intense transient electromagnetic effects on systems on the ground (HEMP 
from high altitude bursts and SREMP from surface bursts) and space (SGEMP from directly impinging ionizing 
radiation and DEMP from dispersed electromagnetic fields). Electromagnetic fields induced by nuclear weapons 
can range up to 1oo's of kilovolts per meter. Nuclear survivability requirements exist for high-value military 
systems. The protection measures are conservative and stringent. Evidence exists that measures employed to achieve 
nuclear electromagnetic survivability may suffice for protecting systems against many non-nuclear effects. 
Check-marks denote those environments that could be treated by a combined effect protection design. We must 
limit our attention to disciplines amenable to readily defined protection engineering techniques, thus Spectrum 
Management and Electronic Warfare (in band ECMlECCM) are considered beyond the scope of the proposed effort. 
, ., 
E3 INTERRELATIONSHIP 
Nuclear Requirements 
~ HEMP (E1, E2, E3) 
~ SREMP 
~ SGEMP/IEMP 
~ DEMP 
Nonnuclear Requirements 
~ EMI/EMC 
~ Lightning 
~ ESD 
~ TEMPEST 
~ EMR 
~ RF Hazards 
~ HPM/UWB 
~ ECM I ECCM (out-of-band) 
ECM I ECCM (in-band) 
Spectrum Management 
~ Candidates for inclusion in an integrated protection approach 
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WAR FIGHTING TREND TOW ARD EXPLOITING ELECTRONICS VULNERABILITIES 
A major objective of command and control warfare (C2W) is to separate the enemy leadership from his forces. In 
future conflicts, offensive measures would be employed to destroy, deny, degrade, confuse, or deceive a 
combatant's capabilities to communicate, sense, reconnoiter, classify, target, and direct an attack. Disruption of 
electronics is an effective means of accomplishing these objectives. Systems particularly susceptible to E3 problems 
include command centers, communications systems, surveillance and targeting systems, information processing, 
decision and display systems, electronic warfare systems, and weapons guidance systems. The proliferation of 
advanced digital and analog electronic information systems makes electronic systems more and more vulnerable 
to disruption by extraneous electromagnetic sources. The problem is made worse by new defense guidance requiring 
that off-the-shelf commercial-spec electronics be used whenever possible. Given the continuing increase in the 
sophistication and capability of electronics on the battlefield and commensurate increase in military reliance on such 
electronics, the effects of E3 disruption of electronic means can have a larger and larger effect on the outcome of 
future conflicts. Thus, a strong need exists to protect our electronics. Requirements need to be made uniform and 
enforceable through stricter controls on design, manufacturing and test requirements. 
, .. 
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WARFIGHTING TREND TOWARD 
EXPLOITING ELECTRONICS 
VULNERABILITIES 
• Separate leadershi·p from forces 
• Targets are electronic technologies embedded in 
-
-
-
-
Precision guided munitions 
Space-based systems 
High-speed decision aids 
C2 
• Control enemy use of the electromagnetic spectra 
• E3 protection becomes critical 
I, 
E3: CONSEQUENCES CAN BE SERIOUS 
The are several documented incidents where E3 resulted in serious accidents, some of which involved injuries 
and/or fatalities. The Blackhawk and Apache helicopters have experienced operational problems around high 
intensity RF sources. An Atlas Centaur FLTSATCOM launch was aborted just prior to launch initiation due to 
lightning strikes in and around the launch complex. A Pershing n missile detonated in Aldheide Germany in an 
accident attributed to charge build-up in the motor case. A Tornado aircraft crash was attributed to interference 
from a nearby radio tower. During the Vietnam era, a very serious accident occurred on board the Forrestal aircraft 
carrier in which RF fields caused an accidental missile launch. The accident caused extensive destruction and loss 
of life. Other classified incidents have been documented. 
E3: CONSEQUENCES CAN BE SERIOUS 
• Helicopter operation irregularities in high-radio-frequency 
(RF) environments (BLACK HAWK, APACHE) 
• ATLAS CENTAUR abort during FL TSATCOM launch 
• PERSHING 2 detonation in Waldheide 
• TORNADO crash near Munich 
• Boeing 747 thrust reverser deployment 
• Forrestal incident 
• Other classified incidents 
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SYSTEM E3 CONCERNS 
Within systems, E3 can have many different effects on operation from safety to data loss to false/misleading system 
status information. As more and more of system functionality has been turned over to electronics, the effects of 
electronics deliberation on mission execution have become more serious. As one example, newer aircraft are using 
electronic controls in place of traditional mechanical subsystems (including "fly-by-wire" subsystems) making them 
more vulnerable to E3. Indicative of the sensitivity of these systems to E3, starting in 1993 commercial airliners 
have banned the operation of certain electronics on ·board aircraft due to incidents of severe interference with 
avionics operation. 
Other notable examples of increased military dependence on electronics and a corresponding increase in E3 
susceptibility include remote sensing and smart munitions. Remote sensing is highly dependent on electronics of 
increasing sophistication. The sensors may include focal plane arrays, RF transmitter-receivers, and lasers. These 
sensors need to fit into small volumes and rely on microminiature electronics that have been shown to be extremely 
sensitive to the electromagnetic environment. Electronics provide the "smart" in smart munitions. If appropriate 
protection is not afforded, these systems are known to be susceptible to E3 especially during the latter part of their 
mission since it is during this time that there is little or no possibility of manual recovery. 
E3 is an important consideration for military electronics across the board. The chart shows a sample of functional 
categories, the effects that upset or damage to the associated electronics can have, and an example of an affected 
system class. Of critical concern are functions/systems where safety is affected. On the battlefield, all listed 
concerns may lead to actual casualties. 
" 
SYSTEM E3 CONCERNS 
FUNCTIONAL CATEGORY CONCERNS RELEVANT SYSTEM CLASSES 
Fly-by-wire Safety Modern aircraft systems 
Remote sensing Data loss Target acquisition 
Fire and forget; fuzing Performance degradation Advanced munitions 
Remote control Mission abort RPV/robotics 
Jam-resistant C31 Timing; sync C31 
Position location, tracking Data loss C31/RSTA 
Ordnance Safety/mission abort Electrically initiated ordnance 
Guidance and control Performance degradation All guided weapons 
Information processing Data loss C31 systems 
Weapon simulation False response Training devices 
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UNIFIED ELECTROMAGNETIC EFFECfS WORKSHOP EXECUTIVE PANEL FINDINGS 
DNA and the Army organized this workshop at the Naval Postgraduate School in October 1991. The workshop 
brought together experts from the major EM disciplines to consider a unified approach to protecting U.S. military 
systems. The sequencing of session presentations and discussions was designed to (1) identify protection 
requirements for emerging EM effects; (2) review how requirements have been met for existing EM effects; (3) 
identify protection and test technology capabilities and limitations; and (4) consider how best to combine system 
EM protection requirements. An Executive Panel comprised of representatives from the Army, Navy, Air Force, 
Defense Nuclear Agency, Strategic Defense Initiative Office, and industry convened on the last day of the 
workshop. 
The panel concluded that unification of electromagnetic effects protection is not only feasible, but necessary. The 
panel felt that the technology required to provide the required protection is well in hand, that the major challenge 
will be to improve the process and organization. Panel members were convinced that there is much room for 
improvement in the present DoD E3 policy and process. 
The panel made a number of specific recommendations on future steps to achieve a combined, coherent DoD 
approach: 
1. Define a common set of tenninology. 
2. Review existing hardening specifications, standards, and guidelines to identify overlaps and incompatibilities. 
3. Whenever possible, integrate hardening design guidelines/procedures/processes to handle multiple environments. 
4. Establish minimum requirements for reporting during the system acquisition process regarding how E3 
protection will be achieved and verified. 
5. Develop a top-level road map document as a guide to all existing E3 documentation. 
6. Establish a DoD/industry working group to provide E3 input to the revision of DoD-1-5000.2. 
7. Assure that future EM simulation facilities address E3 issues and consolidate test facilities and capabilities. 
8. Define "low-risk" protection in a more general context. 
9. Establish procedures to define and incorporate "new" E3 threats. 
10. Establish an E3 hardening data base. 
, . 
'. 
~~L~~4~~ UNIFIED ELECTROMAGNETIC EFFECTS WORKSHOP 
EXECUTIVE PANEL FINDINGS (OCTOBER 1991) 
• Much commonality among EM .effects 
• E3 protection integration (programmatic and technical) is not 
only doa~le but highly desirable 
- Necessary technology is in hand 
Challenge is to define process 
• Need for focus within 000 
Designated OPR 
Top-down OSO guidance 
Flow-down to services, PMs in consistent manner 
Uniform terminology I standards I direction ... 
• Need to address emerging threats (HPM, UW8) 
- Hostile 
Friendly 
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CHALLENGE: MULTIPLICITY OF ENVIRONMENTS 
A major challenge is to interrelate all applicable EM environments with the goal of combining any overlap while 
eliminating any significant over- or under-specification. As shown by the examples in this table there are a 
multiplicity of specifications for EM environment. To a certain degree it may be possible to combine a few of these 
specifications where the important defining parameters tend to overlap without over or under specifying anyone 
environment. This is indeed a difficult challenge, but one that is worthy of consideration. 
The environment sources are divided into hostile and non-hostile classes and are further subdivided into nuclear 
and non-nuclear and into natural and manmade environments, respectively. The hostile non-nuclear environments 
include UWB, RPM and out-of-band ECM. As pointed out earlier, inband EeM will be excluded from this 
integration program. On the non-hostile side, the natural environments include lightning and ESD. EMI including 
effects on ordinance and hazards constitute the man-made environments. Although some waveform characteristics 
vary significantly, there is much overlap in amplitude and frequency. Thus it should be possible to combine some 
specifications where certain environments dominate. 
,
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CHALLENGE: PROLIFERATION OF E3 DOCUMENTATION 
The large number of electromagnetic environments to be reckoned with is more than matched by the proliferation 
of applicable guidelines, standards, and handbooks, over 100 at last count. These documents exhibit redundancy 
in requirements and mitigation techniques. In some cases (e.g., ground techniques), guidelines are inconsistent or 
imcompatible with each other. Associated with the guidelines is a multitude of separate test requirements and 
simulator facilities exhibiting similar redundancies and overlap in environments. These factor provide a strong 
motivation to unify the guidance and approach for dealing with E3. 
, .. 
t, 
CHALLENGE: PROLIFERATION 
OF E3 DOCUMENTATION 
MILSTD-1 385B 
AR 70-60 
NUCLEAR SURVIVABILITY 
AR MY MATERIEL 
MIL·STD-483 
CONFIGURATION 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
FOR SYSTEMS, ." 
PRECLUSION OF ORDNANCE 
HAZARDS IN 
ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS 
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OPNAVINST 3401.2 
NUCLEAR'SURVIVABILITY OF 
U,S, NAVY AND U,S, MARINE 
CORPS SYSTEMS 
AFR 80-38 
THE U.S, AI R FORCE 
SYSTEMS SURVIVABILITY 
PROGRAM 
MIL·HDBK-237A 
EMC MANAG EMENT 
GUIDE FOR PLATFORMS, 
SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT 
MIL-STO-1377 
EFFECTIVENESS OF CABLE 
CONNECTOR AND WEAPON 
ENCLOSURE SHIELDING ". 
E3 DOC STACK ( I WO 2. 
, , 
;. 
I, 
PROLIFERATION OF E3 DOCUMENTATION 
The reduction of the proliferation of E3 documentation can be accomplished by minimizing the number of 
standards, by combining existing standards where possible and by making them consistent with each other. This 
could include non-DoD standards such as those that may be found under the auspices of the FAA and the mEE. 
For example, in the area of EM grounding and bonding considerably different guidelines are provided for 
EMIlEMC than would be required for nuclear EMP, that is, single point grounding required for EMIlEMC is not 
desirable for EMP. 
The second goal is to integrate the E3 related requirements under the applicable 5000 series of directives and 
instructions. At present the 5000 series calls out the EM survivability and compatibility requirements separately 
and should be combined so that any existing inconsistencies are eliminated. 
I, 
PROLIFERATION OF 
E3 DOCUMENTATION 
• Minimize documentation, combine, and make 
consistent 
• Integrate E3 under applicable 5000-Series 
documents 
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CHALLENGE: OPTIMUM USE OF TEST FACILITIES 
Another challenge will be to optimize the use of existing EM test facilities by eliminating those that are redundant 
and combining others as necessary. Many of the facilities that exist overlap in capability and should be carefully 
reviewed technically and programmatically to ascertain their need. However, a variety of test facilities are required 
due to the differing nature of the various EM environments and the fact that not all systems will have the same 
EM protection requirements. For example, HPM requires higher power levels than EMI and higher frequencies than 
EMP. Lightning and EMP are closer matched from: a spectral point of view but differ in the mode of system 
excitation . 
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OPTIMUM USE OF TEST FACILITIES 
The use of EM test facilities may be optimized by integrating system test requirements and facilities through the 
elimination of redundancies and by the eventual centralization and co-location as deemed to be practical. 
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OPTIMUM USE OF TEST FACILITIES 
• Integrate test requirements and test facilities 
• Eliminate redundancies 
• Centralize and colocate facilities as deemed 
practical 
I, 
COMMITMENT TO E3 
The DoD, DNA, Services and Joint Offices are committed to the development of systems that are survivable to 
modern day E3. Each service has assigned an OPR and associated principal directives that relate to the system E3 
problem. In addition, the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center (ECAC) has been assigned as the OPR 
for the Joint Services. 
COMMITMENT TO E3 
• u.s. Navy I Marines 
- OPRs NAYAIR, NAVSEA, SPAWARS, MCRDAC 
-
Principal Directives: OPNAVINST 3401.3A, OPNAVINST 3401.2 
• U.S. Army 
-
OPRs: OASA (RDA), USAMC 
-
Principal Directives: AAE Memorandum 91-3, ADS-37, TOP-1-1-S11 
• U.S. Air Force 
- OPR: SAF(AQQS), FMA I F~ 
- Principal Directives: MIL-STD-1818, AFR 80-23, AFR 80-38 
• Joint 
- OPR: ECAC 
-
Principal Directive: DoDD 3222.3 
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PROPOSED SOLUTION PATH 
The Unified Electromagnetic Effects Workshop has made the case for combined E3. The Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition has designated the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy [ATSD(AE)] 
as the OPR for Combined Battlefield Environmental Effects. An Executive Steering Committee charter is now 
being defined to be chaired by A TSD(AE). A first order of business for this group will clarification of acquisition 
policy as contained in DoD Instruction 5000.2. 
A DoD effort is envisioned with top level objectives as follows: 
a. To simplify an streamline the acquisition of systems which must withstand multiple E3. 
b. To realize cost, weight, and size economies inherent in using the same protection design featurelhardware 
to mitigate multiple effects. 
Three implementation phases would proceed as follows: 
Phase I: The fIrst phase would matrix effects vs. systems categories. System and effects would be rank-ordered 
based on amenability to combining and simplifying protection req,*ements. Those systems/effects where the largest 
reductions in associated acquisition costs/schedules could be realized would be identified. Phase I would also 
include a survey and assessment of existing protection guidance. 
Phase II: Efforts in the second phase would pursue the top-ranked matrix blocks where combining effects 
requirements produces the largest benefits. The Phase n effort might first produce combined environments 
documentation, followed by development of integrated effects protection engineering guidance. 
Phase Ill: The third phase would place the protection engineering guidance into the DSSP pipeline to codify the 
combined guidance into military standards and handbooks. The culmination of Phase m would be Service-ratified 
combined protection documentation immediately applicable to system acquisition and maintenance. 
DNA has initiated a joint pilot program the Army SSDC to develop combined E3 guidelines for critical ground-
based C4I and missile defense systems. This effort has determined the technical feasibility of combined E3 designs 
and developed an initial draft guidelines document. 
. .. 
. ~ 
. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
• E3 protection more and more important 
Electronics attrition could determine outcome of conflicts 
HPRF weapon technology is advancing 
• Need for uniform and consistent E3 protection of U.S. systems 
• EMP hardening offers excellent baseline for unified E3 protection 
Have standardized protecti'on I test requirements at 
system level 
Test results show EMP hardening mitigates other effects 
• DNA has developed and coordinated program approach and 
initiated pilot program 
• Integration of commercial and military standards could provide 
payoff in cost effectiveness and uniformity of EM protection 
• Payoffs in cost effectiveness, control I audit, uniform EM 
protection 
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CONCLUSIONS 
E3 protection has become critical to war fighting. As we tum more of our command, control, communications, 
targeting, and weapon functions over to electronics we must recognize the risks. The technologically advanced 
equipment used to provide a decisive advantage is a double-edged sword. Failure to recognize protection 
requirements while electronics are advancing can have serious consequences, especially if we continue to rely on 
electronics to increase efficiency of our military with smaller numbers. It is conceivable that electronics attrition 
could determine the outcome of future conflicts. These problems are exacerbated by the advent of high power 
microwave weapon technology. 
Our national workshop on Unified EM Effects Hardening pointed to the need for uniform and consistent protection. 
EMP protection has been shown to mitigate other electromagnetic effects including lightning and microwaves. Thus 
for systems with EMP requirements, an integrated approach should be straightforward, using the conservative EMP 
approach as the baseline. For other systems, integration of commercial and military standards could also provide 
payoff in cost effectiveness and uniformity of EM protection. 
It is generally agreed that combining E3 requirements is technically feasible. The difficult challenge is to define 
the process and organize the individual communities and organizations to work together to achieve a coherent and 
unified engineering and testing approach and standard documentation. 
, 
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INTEGRATED E3 PROTECTION 
FOR FIXED FACILITY 
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INTEGRATED E3 PROTECTION: FIXED FACILITY EXAMPLE 
This example depicts common protection engineering features and indicates that each feature mitigates several 
electromagnetic effects. Combined effects guidance should specify a balanced protection approach that considers 
the effects in toto rather than as individual requirements. Major cost savings can be realized with such an approach 
as well as systems with protection that is both complete (no effects overlooked, lost) and balanced (not 
overhardened to any particular effects). 
• 
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GENERIC EM PROTECTION 
ENGINEERING METHOD 
• Reduce EM coupling by 
- Shielding 
- Grounding and bonding 
- Isolation 
• Reduce transients at equipment using 
- Filters 
- ESAs 
- Clamping diodes 
• Reduce effect on equipment by 
- Robust subsystems and piece parts 
- Software checks 
- Circumvention I reset techniques 
. . 
" 
GENERIC EM PROTECTION ENGINEERING METHOD 
There is much commonality among the various electromagnetic disciplines. The same protection engineering tools 
apply. The first line of defense is at the system level where EM coupling is reduced by shielding, grounding, 
bonding and dielectric isolation. Inside the system, equipment interference is eliminated by the use of filters, 
electrical surge arresters (ESAs) and voltage clamps. Effects of spurious electrical effects is further reduced on 
internal equipment by the choice of robust subsystems and pieceparts, software checks, and circumvention/reset 
techniques. 
· .. 
I, 
PROPOSED SOLUTION PATH 
(COORDINATED WITH SERVICES) 
• Organize and conduct national workshop 
• Identify aSO-level E3 OPR to provide defense-wide policy 
• Clarify aso policy 
• Establish interim E3 protection integration coordination panel 
• Develop integrated E3 protection I testing approach 
- DNA pilot program in place for· F.GBC41 and USASDC systems 
• Demonstrate approach on these systems 
• Develop widely applicable technical implementation guidance 
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